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Abstract This paper explores the impact of external accountability on four mech-
anisms of network-internal quality control and the properties of (mandated) inter-
organizational networks. An explorative case study approach examines the external
accountability of a newly established educational network (MAT) and how schools
and the Trust are held accountable by the English Inspectorate of Education, Ofsted
and the Department for Education (DfE), through Regional Schools Commissioners
(RSCs). Analysis of documents and interviews were used to reconstruct a sequence
of events over a period of five and a half years. Our findings indicate that the
combination of accountability activities led to more centralized control over, and
monitoring of curriculum, assessment and school improvement. This was accom-
panied by a pause in the growth of the Trust and the establishment of a regional
structure of school collaboration. As accountability is particularly organized around
individual school performance (through Ofsted inspections), this limited develop-
ment of internal mechanisms of quality control around network-level outcomes. A
short-term focus dominated the allocation of resources to schools in special mea-
sures or with an upcoming inspection visit. In the discussion, an alternative model is
presented for network-level accountability and a set of indicators for effective
accountability of collaborative arrangements.
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1 Introduction
Many governments recognize the limitations of centralized policy in motivating school
improvement and turn to Bnetwork governance^ to coordinate school systems (Janssens
and Ehren 2016). Network governance is described by Meuleman (2008) as the third
form of governance, emerging in the 1990s out of the dominant hierarchical-control
and market-governance styles of the time. Network governance involves policies that
link different stakeholder organizations around a public policy purpose and a set of
joint goals (Mayne and Rieper 2003) such as preventing drop-out of students in their
transitioning from lower to upper secondary education.
Government policy in England has followed the trend of increased network gover-
nance in incentivizing a range of school-to-school partnerships, particularly the model
of a BMulti-Academy Trust^ (MAT). MATs are chains of publicly funded independent
schools (academies) which are run by a Trust (Board of Directors). Academies and their
Trust must follow the law and guidance on admissions, exclusions and special educa-
tion needs and disabilities, but benefit from greater freedom.1 They can set pay and
conditions for their staff, decide on how to deliver the curriculum and they have the
ability to change the length of terms and set their own school hours.
BMATs are the only structures which formally bring together leadership, auton-
omy, funding and accountability across a group of academies in an enduring
way, and are the best long term formal arrangement for stronger schools to
support the improvement of weaker schools.^ (DfE 2016, p. 57).
In 2012, there were 312 academy chains in England, with 39% of the academies
being part of a chain. By 2015, nearly two thirds of the 4725 academies were in MATs
and 517 MATs had 2 to 5 academies, 98 with 6–15 and 19 MATs with 16 or more or
schools (some up to as many as 66 schools), located in different regions across
England.
Popp et al. (2014) summarize the benefits of inter-organizational networks, such as
MATs, as sharing risks, innovation, flexibility and responsiveness. According to Gray
et al. (2003), networks can create synergy when the partnership adds value by com-
bining mutually reinforcing interests, can transform different views into an ideological
consensus or can enhance (financial) efficiency when the use of resources is maximized
across the partners in the network. Bringing actors together who depend on one another
in delivering services can increase the effectiveness of these services according to Klijn
and Koppejan (2014) and is expected to be an answer to complex policy problems
where actors need one another’s resources to achieve solutions. Popp et al. (2014)
further suggest that the creation of inter-organizational networks can be a strategy for
developing a structure that is more nimble and able to effect change than bureaucratic
1 Local authorities however remain responsible for Special Educational Needs and Safeguarding of pupils
both in their maintained schools as in academies, but they need to voice concerns about these (and other
issues) in academies to the Secretary of State (see Department for Education, May 2014, Schools causing
concern; Statutory guidance for local authorities).
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organizations under centralized hierarchical control. The UK government’s reference to
a Bself-improving system^ indicates that it has similar ambitions with the introduction
of MATs (DfE 2016).
Klijn and Koppejan (2014) describe how there is a growing need to hold networks
such as MATs, to account, especially where concerns have been raised with respect to
their behaviour and performance. A recent inquiry of MATs by the UK Education
Select Committee posed questions around the effectiveness and efficiency of Trusts,
referencing press coverage of excessive pay rises of CEOs of Trusts (e.g. Schools
Week, March 11, 2016). Popp et al. (2014) describe how strong ongoing monitoring
and evaluation of networks from the earliest stages of their development is an important
strategy for identifying and addressing any unintended negative consequences of inter-
organizational networks.
The accountability of networks is however problematic due to the diffuse and
ambiguous nature of collaborative arrangements, the changing (contribution of
members to) network-level outcomes and the sometimes conflicting expectations
of stakeholder and client groups. Several authors (Mayne and Rieper 2003;
Schwartz 2003; Janssens and Ehren 2016) explain how the aims and objectives
of networks are often not centrally defined, but result from collaborative efforts
and fragile compromises between partners with different political, social and
economic aims. Such issues complicate external accountability as most partners
in a network will be ill at ease with being held to account for something they do
not have complete control over. Traditional top-down models of accountability
will have great difficulty in disentangling how being in the network has impacted
on the performance of its individual members, or to what extent each member has
contributed to network-level outcomes. As Klijn and Koppejan (2014) point out,
most accountability systems are firmly grounded in monocentric, state-oriented
models of governance, which presuppose that Baccountor^ and Baccountee^ are
known, coherent, straightforward entities embedded in a single and clear-cut
governance system. When public policy is produced in complex networks featur-
ing multiple, overlapping coordination mechanisms, the very identification and
make up of accountability relationships becomes problematic (Romzek 2000). An
important question is therefore how vertical accountability mechanisms can be
designed or strengthened in such a way that they do not hinder or disturb the
governance network processes, while complementing and reinforcing horizontal
accountability mechanisms (see also Klijn and Koppejan 2014).
This paper explores the external accountability of MATs in England as a case
study of how external accountability can be organized to address network function-
ing and performance. Our case study describes how the English Inspectorate of
Education, Ofsted and the Department for Education (DfE) through Regional
Schools Commissioners (RSCs) developed external inspections and monitoring of
MATs. In our case study, we focus on how these arrangements influenced the
development of one newly established nationally operating MAT over time, partic-
ularly their internal mechanisms for quality control and changes in the network
properties of the MAT. In our conclusion and discussion, we will reflect on the
system of external accountability of formal school-to-school networks and propose
a set of indicators for effective accountability of collaborative arrangements. First
we provide a description of networks and their internal quality control mechanisms.
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2 Conceptual framework
2.1 Network properties
BNetworks^ can simply refer to a collaboration of groups of three or more legally
autonomous organizations that work together to achieve a collective goal (Kenis and
Provan 2006), either self-initiated by network members, or mandated or contracted (see
Klijn and Koppejan 2014). Mandated or contracted networks are goal-directed and will
have more stable patterns of social relations, deliberate interactions and structure in
their interactions with organizational arrangements and rules. MATs in England are
typical examples of mandated networks as collaboration of schools within the Trust is
regulated through funding agreements between MATs and the Secretary of State, and
schemes of delegation and terms of reference which outline roles and responsibilities
and decision-making within the Trust. All academies in a MAT are run by a single
board of directors, although the Trust may decide to delegate some functions to school-
level governing bodies; the Trust however remains accountable for the schools and can
take all decisions on how the schools are run.2 Each academy also has a supplemental
funding agreement with the Secretary of State and their accountability is therefore
ultimately to the Department for Education.
Berthod et al. (2016) explain that effectiveness of networks is a product of properties
of the network, such as its governance mode, network structure and network context.
Modes of governance can vary from not brokered shared governance to highly
brokered by one organization, and from participant-led to externally led. Kenis and
Provan (2006) distinguish between Bshared governance^ where the network is entirely
governed by its members and every organization would interact with every other
organization to govern the network, resulting in a dense and highly decentralized form.
In the model of Bnetwork administrative organization governance^, the network is
governed by a unique network administrative organization (NAO), which may be either
voluntarily established by network members or mandated as part of the network
formation process. The administrative entity, which is typically a government entity
or a nonprofit, is set up specifically to govern the network and the activities of the
network and the NAO acts as a broker in coordinating and sustaining the network; the
NAO is not a member of the network. The third model of Blead organization
governance^ is similar in having a brokered form of governance, but the lead partner
in this model is another member organization who is providing its own services as part
of the network. MATs would typically have a lead organization (one of the outstanding
schools in the network) or administrative organization (Trust head office) govern the
network.
As Provan and Kenis (2008) explain, modes of governance change over time as
networks evolve and grow in number of members; the adoption of a particular form of
network governance should be contingent on the trust distribution among network
participants, the number of participants, goal consensus and the nature of tasks. They
argue that as trust becomes less densely distributed throughout the network, as the
2 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/Education/report-education-academies-and-
schools.pdf
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number of participants gets larger, as network goal consensus declines and as the need
for competencies required to achieve network-level goals increases (e.g. skills to
coordinate the network), brokered forms of network governance (lead organization
and NAO) are likely to become more effective than shared-governance networks.
According to Berthod et al. (2016) and Hu et al. (2015), larger networks will struggle
to have effective forms of bottom-up shared governance as members will either ignore
critical network issues or spend large amounts of time trying to coordinate across 10, 20
or more organizations, particularly when participants are spread out geographically.
Larger networks often also face problems with the distribution of trust across the
network and with ensuring goal consensus. Such large networks are therefore more
effective, according to Provan and Kenis (2008), with brokered forms of network
governance, where a separate administrative entity governs the network and its activ-
ities. Shared governance is most likely to be effective when trust is pervasive through-
out the network and provides a strong basis for bottom-up collaboration among
network members, whereas bottom-up initiated collaboration is, according to Provan
and Kenis (2008), less essential in more centralized networks where a lead organization
coordinates collaboration through dyadic ties with individual members. Research on
inter-organizational networks suggests that most networks move from participant-based
governance to governance via lead organizations or network administration when
networks increase in size and heterogeneity (Provan and Kenis 2008).
2.2 External accountability
In defining accountability, we use Klijn and Koppejan’s definition (Klijn and Koppejan
2014, p. 2) who talk about accountability as Bthe extent to which actors (accounters:
those rendering accounts) are held accountable for their behaviour and performance by
other actors (accountees: those to whom account is rendered)^. The actors in our study
are the schools within a MAT, the central staff and the board of directors of the Trust
who are held accountable for the quality of education and performance of children by
the Department for Education. Accountability involves both a process by which the
accounter renders account to the accountee, and accountability mechanisms, i.e. the
procedures, instruments and arrangements by which an account is given (Klijn and
Koppejan 2014). The latter also includes standards of what is considered to be
appropriate behaviour and rules, reflecting norms and values.
The accountability of MATs is primarily organized through Ofsted inspections of both
individual schools and the Trust, in Focused Inspections (FIs, also called Bbatched
inspections^) and a MAT review, as well as through the monitoring of schools and the
Trust by Regional Schools Commissioners, acting on behalf of the Department for
Education. Although Ofsted is, under current legislation, only allowed to inspect schools
with a Unique Reference Number (URN), FIs were introduced in 20143 to allow for an
evaluation of MATs beyond the quality of each individual school. Ofsted’s takes its remit
for FIs from the inspection framework of individual schools4 which explains how in
principle a good school may be inspected once every 5 years, an exemption to which can
3 The first outcome letter of a FI was published 25 March 2014 of E-ACT.
4 http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/resources/framework-for-school-inspection
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bemade when the school is part of a formal grouping of schools such as aMATand shares
important aspects of its provision. In this case, Ofsted considers it appropriate to inspect
several schools in the group at the same time in a FI.
There is no framework for such inspections, but guidelines point out that FIs
include coordinated visits to all the schools in a Trust, looking at differences and
common issues between schools in analysing questionnaires from students,
parents and staff. Common issues across schools are shared and discussed
between the lead inspectors during the inspection week(s), particularly with a
view to discuss any features that could lead to common areas for further
improvement relating to the impact of the Trust. Schools are questioned about
the level of support and challenge from the central office and their collaboration
with other schools in the Trust; school-to-school collaboration is seen as an
important element of school leadership and the school grade for this inspection
standard reflects the extent to which the school engages in collaboration with
other schools.
At the end of a FI (typically in the second or third week), Her Majesty’s
Inspectors5 (HMIs) also interview members from the central staff and a selection
of headteachers of schools within the Trust, and analyse documents from the Trust
to review the functioning of the Trust. The FI and the MAT review leads to an
outcome letter which describes the strengths and weaknesses of academies across
the Trust and the impact of the Trust’s leadership on the individual academies.
The Regional Schools Commissioners also have an important role in the set up
and monitoring of academies and MATs. They were introduced in 2014 to
coordinate the setup of academies and MATs and to monitor their performance
on behalf of the Department for Education. RSCs are responsible for the acade-
mies in their area and make decisions on applications from schools wanting to
become academies and organizations wanting to sponsor an academy. Each RSC
is also responsible for one of the larger national MATs (e.g. ARK, E-ACT). Their
main responsibilities are to do the following6:
& Monitor the performance of the academies in their area
& Take action when an academy is underperforming
& Decide on the creation of new academies
& Make recommendations to ministers about free school applications
& Encourage organizations to become academy sponsors (ensuring that there are
enough high-quality sponsors to meet local need, ensuring each region has a strong
supply of high-quality sponsors)
& Proposing suitable sponsors for poorly performing maintained schools who have
been selected by DfE to become sponsored academies.
& Approve changes to open academies, including the following: changes to age
ranges, mergers between academies, changes to MAT arrangements
5 HMI’s are normally employed full-time by Ofsted as opposed to other contracted staff, many of whom work
in schools in leadership positions. See http://www.ofstedhmi.co.uk/
6 https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/increasing-the-number-of-academies-and-free-schools-to-create-a-
better-and-more-diverse-school-system/supporting-pages/regional-schools-commissioners-rscs
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RSCs are particularly responsible for the oversight and monitoring of those
academies which are in special measures or require improvement according to
Ofsted. Where there is underperformance in an academy school or Trust, the RSC
takes their authority from the funding agreement (the contract between the Secre-
tary of State and the Trust). The RSCs decide solely on breaches of the funding
agreement on the grounds of failure to deliver a good quality education; other
potential breaches, such as conflicts of interest or financial mismanagement, are
dealt with by the Education Funding Agency. The RSCs get support from
headteacher boards (HTBs) which are made up of experienced academy
headteachers in each region who advise and challenge RSCs. These headteachers
are from outstanding academies and are elected by other academy headteachers in
the region.
2.3 Internal quality control in the network
As networks grow and mature, the need for structured mechanisms of internal quality
control also increases. Aviram (2003) refers to four mechanisms networks can use to
enforce norms and regulate the behaviour and performance of members:
i. Information mechanisms; i.e. the collection and dissemination of information on
the credibility and quality of network partners. This facilitates independent
decisions on the contribution of members of the network to network-level outcomes
and potential dysfunctional outcomes of collaboration, such as groupthink, high
transaction costs, power struggles, diffusion of roles and responsibilities (see Mayne
and Rieper 2003). An information mechanism allows members in the network
(as well as those outside of it) to make informed decisions on who to
collaborate with in the network, and on excluding partners who act opportu-
nistically, degrade the overall performance of the network or destroy its
reputation. Peer reviews between schools within MATs, and reviews of the
quality of central services are examples such information mechanisms. These
can show, for instance, whether some schools bias their admission processes to
favour students from privileged backgrounds, or if the Trust takes too many
failing schools requiring high levels of central support.
ii. Exclusion mechanisms; in mature networks there are formal and transparent
procedures to deny members access, either permanently or temporarily.
Aviram (2003) describes how the threat of expulsion or suspension will ensure
the compliance of each member to the norms of the network. In England, this
mechanism mainly operates through the RSCs who are in charge of removing
schools from a Trust or re-brokering schools into other Trusts in the case of
failing performance or after the funding agreement expires. Several authors
(Hill 2008; Greany and Ehren 2016) argue for greater clarity in these proce-
dures, particularly of the criteria used to re-broker schools, and also for shorter
timelines of funding agreements (from 7 to 5 years) to allow academies to move
between Trusts more easily.
iii. Centralized control over facilities required for transactions between network
members and control over members’ assets enforces members’ compliance to
network-norms and contribution to network-level outcomes. In our case, this
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concerns collaboration between schools and Trust central staff support of
schools. Centralized control is a preventative mechanism, in that it allows
the network to better monitor transactions for opportunism and possibly
prevent or modify these transactions (Aviram 2003). Control mechanisms
may be employed in bilateral transactions such as between two schools,
whereas large networks tend to have a centralized facility to control the
transactions between its members. Examples with large MATs (16+ schools)
include a central head office, implementing and monitoring systems of oper-
ational and financial planning, target setting, data tracking and performance
management across schools in the Trust (see Hutchings et al. 2014). Some of
these systems also include centralized planning of teaching and learning
through the prescription of curricula, lesson planning, time tabling and assess-
ment schemes. The development and implementation of these systems is paid
for by top slicing a percentage of the schools’ budgets.
iv. Switching mechanisms (Aviram 2003) replace defaulted transactions with alterna-
tive ones or find alternative members for those excluded. For MATs this could
mean replacing schools re-brokered into other Trusts, or switching ineffective
forms of school-to-school collaboration with more effective ones.
These four mechanisms for internal quality control are important for the stability and
the performance of the network and its long-term survival (Mandell and Keast 2007).
Aviram (2003) explains how these mechanisms support the development of successful
collaboration, and the creation of a new organizational form that exists by itself, over
and above its individual network members. Network participants feel part of this whole
and no longer only loyal to their home school.
In this case study, we are interested in learning how external accountability impacts
on these four mechanisms of internal quality control and the properties of (mandated)
inter-organizational networks (governance, size and growth).
3 Methodology
We employed an explorative case study approach to capture the way in which external
accountability impacts on the functioning and performance of an inter-organizational
network. Our in-depth, single case study allowed us to create a dataset going beyond
the one-shot surveys or use of secondary data used in most research on public networks.
This longitudinal dataset describes the network in action over a period of 5.5 years and
reveals the changes in the functioning of the network and how these relate to (changing)
external accountability. The selection of our case study MAT therefore informs an
emerging theory about effective accountability of collaborative arrangements, and how
to design such systems that address the complexities of inter-organizational collaboration.
Our case study MAT is currently one of the larger nationally organized Trusts.
The Trust has a portfolio of primary and secondary schools and a central office
providing back office services to its schools (e.g. HR and financial management),
supporting schools and brokering collaboration between schools through a model
which fits Provan and Kenis’ (2008) description of Bnetwork administrative
organization^ governance.
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3.1 Data collection
The Trust received a FI in year 5, in addition to regular Ofsted school inspections,
and regular RSC monitoring visits of academies within the Trust, and of the
central head office. In our case study, we retrospectively analysed changes in
response to these accountability interventions. Our period of study starts with the
inception of the Trust in year 1 and ends in September year 6.
We conducted interviews with those directly involved in the external account-
ability of the MAT (HMI, RSC), as well as interviews with headteachers of
schools involved in the FI and the Trust CEO. Interview questions aimed to
enhance our understanding of how specific accountability interventions (single
school and focused inspections, RSC monitoring) had impacted on the properties
of the network, and network-internal mechanisms of quality control. All the
interviews were recorded and transcribed with prior consent of participants while
findings are reported anonymously and without identifying information to protect
the identity and reputation of the Trust, HMI and the RSC. As such, actual years
for data have been changed to years 1–6, as have exact numbers of schools, years
of Ofsted inspection reports and references to geographical locations. Interviews
took place in the spring of year 5.
Second, we collected archival material from the Trust and outcomes of external
inspections and monitoring of schools and the Trust (e.g. Ofsted school reports,
Ofsted outcome letter, RSC pre-warning notices). Archival material spanned a
timeframe of 5.5 years, and was used to construct a database where events were
recorded according to the main variables in our conceptual framework. Triangu-
lating interviews and archival material provides some reassurance that interpreta-
tions are not shaped by an idiosyncratic account of events. Table 1 provides a
summary of our data collection.
Table 1 Case study data collection
HMI/RSC/DfE/EFA Trust/central staff Academies and free school in the trust
- Interview with National School
Commissioner and Regional
School Commissioner
- Group interview with 6 HMI
(including lead inspector of FI)
- Interview with Ofsted director of
education policy
- Analysis of outcome letter of FI
year 5
- Analysis of DfE notice letters to
academy trusts about poor or
inadequate performance or
weaknesses in safeguarding,
governance or
financialmanagement
(pre-warning notices to 2
academies)
- Analysis of RSC websites
- Interview with CEO of the trust
- Analysis of website, 5 annual
reports, Articles of
association, Master funding
agreement, Register of local
governing bodies, scheme of
delegation in year 5
Analysis of website and all Ofsted
schoolinspection reports since
conversion to academy status of
all the schools that were part of
the Trust between years 1 and 6
Interviews with 6 headteachers of
schools inspected as part of the
FI
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3.2 Data analysis
Sequences of events served as the basis for our data analyses. Each interview and
document was coded according to the variables in our conceptual framework in
which we recorded events for 6-month intervals to provide a chronological
timeline of changes in each of the variables between the inception of the Trust
in year 1 and the end date of our study in September, year 6. Events were recorded
for intervals of January to August, and September to December, taking into
account the 2-month summer period (July–August) when schools are closed and
generally no major changes are implemented. Events refer to actions, activities
and policies that provide a time-stamped description of external accountability,
internal quality control and properties of the network.
We used two phases to code our data and collate a database of chronological
events. In the first phase, all the archival material and interviews were investigated
for types of observations (e.g. activities, events, policies) within each variable.
Our analysis resulted in a list of observations for each variable as shown in
Table 2. Decisions were then made on how to classify specific activities, policies
Table 2 Specification of variables in activities, events and policies
Variable Events for case description
External accountability Ofsted school inspections, FI and MAT review, RSC monitoring
of schools, RSC monitoring of the Trust (timing, judgement
and feedback on the functioning and performance of the Trust)
Internal quality control
Information mechanism Changes in policies to implement Trust-wide peer reviews
and actual peer reviews in schools, external reviews of governance
of schools and of the network, Trust-level monitoring of academies
(timing and outcomes of these reviews, such as safeguarding visits,
performance monitoring, financial monitoring)
Switching mechanism Changes in collaboration between schools and support provided
by the central staff
Exclusion mechanism Transfer of schools to other Trusts, and brokering and re-brokering
schools through the RSC
Control mechanism Changes in allocation of resources (membership fee) and coordinating
transactions between schools in working groups (coordination
of schools is described under governance)
Network properties
Governance Changes in structure (e.g. introduction of regional structure, changes
in roles and responsibilities of central staff, schemes of delegation
and terms of reference, improvement boards with central staff), roll
out of centralized systems (e.g. common assessment policy,
common systems for financial planning and monitoring)
Size and growth (Increasing/declining) numbers of academies in the Trust
Composition Primary/secondary, sponsored/new academies/free schools: voluntary
or forced brokering; location of schools and distances between
schools and the head office
Educ Asse Eval Acc
and events, particularly those that could fall under multiple variables, such as the
development and implementation of centralized performance monitoring, which is
both an element of internal quality control, as well as a change in governance of
the network. This specification of variables was then used to code all the materials
according to time frame in phase 2. In phase 3, we validated the timeline of
changes in an interview with the CEO of the Trust.
4 Findings
Our case study MAT started in year 1 with one secondary converter academy and
grew over time with a peak in number of (both primary and secondary) schools in
year 3/4. Schools are dispersed across the country in several different counties,
some of the schools are in the same county as the head office, while others are
located over 150 miles away.
4.1 External accountability
Inspections of schools Following the expansion of the Trust, there were regular
school inspections and in several cases the initial inspection outcomes were disap-
pointing. In the inspection reports, comments are made on where the Trust needs to
improve and where its structures and support of individual academies has been
more or less effective; recommendations are made on a range of issues. Identified
priorities included developing better systems to monitor pupil performance and
hold teachers and leaders to account, developing more specific school improvement
actions plans, training subject leaders and reviewing the Trust’s governance.
Focused inspection andMATreview The Trust received a FI and a MAT review in
the first half of year 5. The FI included inspections of six academies and telephone
interviews with the headteachers of the other academies. The CEO and
headteachers who were part of the FIs explain how the Trust was not formally
informed about the FI, but this became apparent as further schools were inspected
in the same week and headteachers started calling each other and the head office.
The MAT review was scheduled in the second week after the FI and included
interviews with central staff and several headteachers, as well as further analysis
of Trust documentation.
The outcome letter of the FI includes a range of strengths and weaknesses and
recommendations, such as on the gathering and analysis of pupil outcomes and
attendance (particularly of specific groups of pupils), how the headteacher perfor-
mance management needs to include targets on the performance of vulnerable
groups, and the development of a coherent cross-trust strategy to improve the
support of, and provision for these pupils. The headteacher of Primrose academy
explained how, contrary to school inspections, more credence is given to devel-
opment plans instead of (only) outcomes and current practice. The head teacher of
Campanula further expressed caution in criticizing the Trust as she felt it might
impact on the school’s own inspection outcome, and she felt it was important to
Btoe the party line^.
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RSCmonitoring of schools In addition to Ofsted, RSCs have become an important
part of the accountability regime for all academies. Before 2014, monitoring by
the DfE primarily included visits to new (free) schools. From 2014 onwards, with
the start of RSCs, monitoring was expanded to include academies failing to
deliver good education, defined as not meeting targets for student performance
on national standardized assessments (Key Stage 2 or 4 floor standards), being on
a downwards trajectory or judged to be inadequate by Ofsted (Brequires
improvement^ or Bspecial measures^).
Academies and a free school in the Trust received RSC monitoring visits
shortly after their opening or Ofsted inspection, two of the academies received a
pre-warming notice.
The respective RSCs and the Trust discussed the restructuring of the Trust
schools in order to make the schools more geographically coherent and thereby
increase the level of support for school improvement. Between years 1 and 6, the
RSC re-brokered a number of schools into other Trusts.
Headteachers refer to RSC’s as Bthe DfE^, or Beducational advisors^, and are
not always clear about who was visiting the school, who sent written reports or
with whom they were communicated. There is no public record of monitoring
activities and visits of the RSC or their educational advisors; however (according
to the Headteacher of Foxglove Academy), a confidential letter or report to the
school was provided for the central office of the Trust and governors of the school.
The lack of framework and variety of practices or guidelines for RSC visits
caused anxiety and confusion in schools. The headteacher of Primrose also
described these as far less rigorous compared to Ofsted inspections. On occa-
sions, particularly in the early stages of their work, the RSC judgement of school
effectiveness was at variance with the Ofsted view, and often more lenient, but,
according to the headteacher of Amaryllis, RSC monitoring became more rigor-
ous over time.
RSC monitoring of the Trust The CEO of the Trust explains how he and his
education and financial director (from 2014 onwards) also have termly meetings
with the RSC to discuss performance data and potential problems in schools. The
meeting is informed by a risk analysis of key stage test performance data,
predictions for future performance, pupil numbers in each school and Ofsted
grades. Schools are highlighted in red, amber or green, or black to reflect their
performance and areas of concern. The RSC will ask what kind of improvement
package the Trust has in place for high risk schools. High risk schools are visited
by (RSC related) advisors, or discussions with the EFA are brokered in case of
budgetary problems. The RSC particularly looked at academies performing below
the floor standards and action plans of those academies. In the meeting, targets are
set for the Trust to improve schools where performance is low.
The schedule of inspections and external monitoring of the MAT predominantly
focuses on individual school performance through inspections and RSC monitor-
ing of individual schools. Monitoring of the Trust itself only began in year 4,
consisting of the termly meetings and the focused inspections and MAT review.
Consequently, individual school inspections are an important benchmark for
performance of the Trust as the headteacher of Campanula Academy explains:
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Bwell obviously it’s a benchmark isn’t it, it’s a marker for them [the Trust] to know
how well their schools are doing. It’s…I’m going to say a status symbol but I
don’t…well I do mean it, they do like to say we’ve got X amount of Outstanding
schools, X amount of Good schools, of course they do, that’s how they are viewed
by the outside world. So it’s important to them.^
Below we will describe how the range of accountability interventions impacted on
internal quality control in the Trust and the network properties of the Trust.
4.2 External accountability and internal mechanisms for quality control
4.2.1 Information mechanisms
Our data file shows how the Trust and subgroups of schools within the Trust
developed a range of activities over the years aimed at collecting and disseminat-
ing information on the quality of its schools. Activities include peer reviews of
groups of schools, external reviews of governance of the Trust and of individual
schools, and external reviews of how schools spend their pupil premium budget.
Centralized monitoring also covered school financial and operational planning,
performance data and safeguarding (through visits to schools by central staff).
These activities are initiated in response to Ofsted school inspections and the FIs.
Over time, those inspections push for a more structured approach to internal
quality control, and more centralized monitoring. Performance data are, from year
4, also discussed in termly meetings between the Trust’s central team and the
RSC, requiring the Trust to have an up to date picture of the performance of their
schools on standardized national assessments and in relation to external targets, as
described by its CEO:
BUnless we know what’s happening in the schools and we’ve got good data then
we can’t make judgements and decisions and analyse what’s going on in our
schools well. This is important because A, to help different schools help each
other, but B, because the trustees are held accountable by the Secretary of State
for the performance of their schools. You know, we are the most accountable
system, externally accountable system, I think, in Europe, in terms of Ofsted
inspections, in terms of publications, performance tables, so there’s no getting
away from it, you know, ministers hold people like me and my trustees to account
for how well the accountability works in the trust.^
In the inspection reports of Celosia academy and Amaryllis academy, comments
are made on the accuracy of assessment data. After this, the Trust develops
centralized systems for moderating assessments in primary schools and starts
implementing systems to track and monitor performance data. In school inspection
reports, Ofsted also calls for action plans by the Trust and comments on the
suitability of those plans, motivating the Trust to be more specific in their action
points and checking the accuracy of (their analysis) of school performance data to
inform those actions. Ofsted school inspections impact on the timeline of such changes
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in setting a timeline for the implementation of changes in the inspection report, and
through the scheduling of follow-up monitoring visits to check on progress.
Headteachers of Foxglove, Campanula, Nerine and Primrose, and the CEO of the
Trust talk about how the FI indicated the need to develop clearer structures and
frameworks within the Trust to hold schools to account and how the central staff
needed to have a better understanding of Bwhat was happening at grassroots level^. The
years 4 and 5 annual Trust report (p. 12) describes how the Trust will, in line with
recommendations from Ofsted’s FI, expand on systems to track and support disadvan-
taged and vulnerable students in all schools to secure better outcomes for these learners.
The shift from an initial monitoring of financial and operational planning towards
increased monitoring of curriculum, teaching and school performance also reflects a
natural growth pattern within the Trust. As the years 1 and 2 annual Trust reports
explain, incoming schools initially had limited experience in standard accounting
procedures, having relied for the most part on local authority financial management.
As a result, the Trust had to dedicate time and effort to ensuring that all schools had an
effective financial management and reporting system in place. In the early years of the
Trust, time and effort also went into managing communication about the opening of
new schools with the DfE. As a result, the Trust had a dedicated free school manager on
staff. Once the new schools were running and operational and financial systems were
established, the Trust directed its efforts towards school improvement and school
performance, which was reinforced by the increasing external accountability and
monitoring of school and Trust performance.
According to the headteacher of Primrose academy, by year 6, there is a core student
performance data system across the Trust developed by schools which includes four
annual time points to report data to the Trust, or five time points for schools in special
measures. The data is used to look at how pupil premium pupils in one region compare
to their non-pupil premium peers, makes comparisons between schools and groups of
students, and identifies strengths and weaknesses within and across schools. According
to the headteacher of Nerine free school, the Trust included these data in monitoring
visits to schools, which started in September year 5, but the headteachers of Campanula
and Nerine thought that there was scope for improving the structure of these visits.
Peer review Some of the schools are involved in peer reviews during the course of
our study. The years 2 and 3 Annual Reports explain how groups of schools come
together in small improvement partnerships, including collaboration between
teachers and leaders, joint research projects and school-to-school support. The
outcome of reviews is confidential and aims to support the school in improvement
by outlining and discussing weaknesses.
The peer reviews generally focused on specific curriculum areas in schools, such as
a school’s English, Mathematics or Science department, and were highly valued, in
some cases one of the reasons for joining the Trust. The headteacher of Primrose
academy said that the subject review in her school in September year 4 had great
impact as heads were honest with each other,
Bour school matters to them as much as the school they’re working in because we
are one collective entity. And therefore, their investment, not just in the review, but
the follow up to that review was great and had a great impact^.
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The impact of the review was also high according to the headteacher, because Trust
advisers, who lead the review, were held to account for their work in the school through
their performance management. The headteacher of Foxglove explains how the peer
review had created a culture of openness and collaboration:
BI think the Trust has definitely moved to the fact that the school leaders are as
open and honest with the Trust, more so than they would be with an Ofsted
inspector where you want to paint the rosy view, whereas the Trust is not seen in
that respect. I think there was a feel, you know, three years ago where if
everything on paper looked fine you could keep the central team at bay and
carry on doing your day job, whereas now it’s much more collaborative, and the
fact of forced collaboration… you are not allowed to keep your door shut, you
need to have people in and stuff.^
In cases where the outcome of reviews had not been implemented, headteachers
cited a number of reasons, including network-internal issues, where headteachers
criticize the skills of the lead reviewer, where the number of participating schools
was too big to be effective or a lack of follow-up after the review event. Other
reasons are related to the intensive external accountability, particularly for schools
who are judged to be Brequiring improvement^ or Bin special measures^. These
schools receive intensive Ofsted and RSC monitoring and headteachers (Amaryl-
lis, Foxglove, Nerine) explain that schools do not have the time or the capacity to
prepare for the peer review on top of the external monitoring, while heads Bwould
not get much out of^ participating in peer reviews on top of external inspections
and RSC monitoring.
4.2.2 Control mechanisms
Centralized control over transactions in the network are enacted by central staff who
broker collaboration between schools in the form of support provided by outstanding
schools to failing schools, exchange of staff or joint development of staff training.
Transactions between the head office and individual schools include the support of
schools in difficulty and the internal accountability and monitoring described in the
previous section. The membership fees allow the central office to redistribute part of
schools’ funding to shape transactions both between schools and between the central
staff and individual schools.
Schools’Ofsted grades have an impact on the distribution of resources within the Trust
through the calculation of these membership fees. The model reflects a strategy where
Trust-level support is primarily allocated to schools with failing Ofsted grades who are
expected to pay for this support. One of the headteachers however explains that, at the end
of year 6, this strategy is changing towards everybody paying the samemembership fee as
a percentage of the school budget, according to pupil numbers. This underlines a change
in principle where the school’s budget is now seen as BTrust money and not school
money ,^ according to the headteacher. Support is however, predominantly given to
schools with an upcoming inspection visit or schools in special measures.
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4.2.3 Switching mechanisms
As previously described, support of schools by the Trust initially focuses on operational
and financial issues and gradually moves towards school improvement. Examples of
Trust central staff’s support of schools are as follows:
& A support programme in areas of statutory and financial compliance
& Support in conversion to an academy
& Dealing with administrative issues around new school buildings
& Applications to open free school
& Financial support of schools in deficit
& Staff training and mentoring, e.g. to develop assessment, teaching and learning in
core subjects and leadership and management
& Brokering professional development through teaching schools outside of the Trust.
The Trust actively promotes collaboration between schools by partnering staff from
outstanding schools to work alongside schools judged by Ofsted to be inadequate or in
special measures. Trust staff are deployed to work in schools struggling to fill vacan-
cies, and the implementation of shared systems (e.g. HR, financial planning, curriculum
and assessment) allows schools to exchange staff to plug gaps. Collaboration is
reinforced through the peer review programme, but geographical proximity and simi-
larity between schools is an important condition for successful collaboration.
Ofsted inspections of individual schools and the FI have a major impact on the
collaboration between schools and in informing the support of schools by central staff.
The headteachers of Campanula and Nerine, and the RSC explain how the support of
the Trust is primarily allocated to schools judged to be inadequate or requiring
improvement by Ofsted (Bschools in crisis^), or to schools with an imminent inspec-
tion, creating an unequal allocation of resources and an emphasis on the short term.
Bso if a school is in special measures or requires improvement, or they [the Trust]
are worried about them, you know, everybody and their uncle will be in and
checking and helping and making sure, and actually if you are doing OK then it’s
perhaps perceived as not being a priority, and if resources are limited then you’d,
you know, you’d put your resources where they need it most really.^ (Headteacher
of Campanula Academy)
While all schools get termly visits, safeguarding reviews and an analysis of atten-
dance and other data, schools in special measures or with an upcoming Ofsted
inspection receive intensive additional help, including an Improvement Board with
Trust representatives, leadership training or various forms of in-school support. A
corollary of this was a lack of central coordination around CPD or career pathways
for all schools, for instance. From year 4/5 (Annual Report) onwards, the Trust started
developing a stronger regional structure. The headteacher of Campanula expected this
to provide a more sustainable and structured model of school collaboration and support.
Further changes in response to external accountability include the move from
external consultants to in-house support for school improvement. Reliance on the
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former was mentioned in an interview with the RSC as an impediment to sustained
improvement and as one of the areas for improvement in the FI outcome letter. From
year 4/5 onwards, school improvement has been primarily offered in-house by central
staff, peers and through working groups, according to the CEO.
4.2.4 Exclusion mechanisms
At the start of our study, the MAT takes on a number of schools while also opening up
new ones. There was no structured mechanism in place at national level to exclude
schools from MATs until RSCs came into office in 2014. They have authority to
approve new academy trusts and to assist in the Bre-brokering^ of some academies
from one Trust to another.
During the course of the study, the Trust, in discussion with the respective RSCs,
decided to reduce the size of the MAT and reorganize along new regional cluster lines.
The intention was to make possible increased school-to-school collaboration. The
RSCs enabled the re-brokering of some schools into new MATs.
4.3 External accountability and changes in network properties
4.3.1 Size and composition
The initial strong push from government for the growth of academies and MATs waned
during the time period we cover here. The House of Commons Education Select
Committee became concerned over the relationship between schools and their spon-
sors, leading to a situation where some of the large multi academy sponsors were forced
to reduce the number of schools that they were sponsoring and a trend towards smaller
groups of three to eight academy schools, working in local groupings as the structure of
choice (Talbot 2014).
This trend is also visible in our Trust which sees a pause in growth from January
year 4 onwards, with a number of schools being re-brokered into other Trusts, or
joining other Trusts. The pause in growth also coincides with the reorganization of
the portfolio of schools into regional clusters to better support and consolidate
improvement of existing schools (head teacher Primrose, CEO, annual reports
years 3/4 and 4/5).
The Trust’s primary schools are, according to Ofsted, relatively high
performing and the secondary schools are more mixed in their performance levels.
An explanation for this can be found in the interview with the CEO who says that
the Trust has particularly experienced issues in the improvement and support of its
secondary academies due to the large and complex scale of these organizations,
compared to the smaller primary schools. One of the HMI also explains how the
Trust’s engagement with secondary schools was much more challenging than
support for primary schools: Bthe secondary phase, in particular, were more
stubbornly entrenched; the primaries were willing to have a go, move things
forward, the secondary were less so^.
Five academies were eventually Bre-brokered^ into other Trusts. This was
prompted by disappointing results from Ofsted inspections and the monitoring
of the RSCs. The views of the RSC were central to these decisions. One RSC
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explains that there was a consideration of the extent to which the Trust had the
capacity to support and improve the schools, and whether other Trusts might be
better placed to provide school support. After some discussion, the decision to re-
broker was eventually agreed on a voluntary basis by the Trust.
According to the headteacher of Primrose academy, one of the schools being re-
brokered, this analysis did not always offer the best solution as the RSC would
only look for a Bsafe option^ in choosing one of the larger MATs, instead of going
for a smaller local alternative of a small MAT that had similar systems in place.
The Headteacher feels her school was pushed into another large MAT and now has
to start over in implementing new systems which she describes as Ba setback^.
4.3.2 Governance
As the Trust grows and the external accountability increases, the governance of
schools also changes from shared, decentralized to increasingly centralized and
brokered by the central staff. Changes are evidenced in an increased control over
school governance, a restructuring of the central staff, the introduction of a
regional structure to coordinate collaboration between schools, structuring the
performance management of headteachers and clearer schemes of delegation.
These changes follow a natural pattern of growing and maturing networks as
described by Provan and Kenis (2008), but as the external accountability tightens over
time (e.g. with the start of structured termly meetings with the RSC in year 4), the Trust
is also increasingly required to increase the level of control over their schools as is
evidenced in the following quote from the CEO:
BI think that when I took up post I would describe the way that the schools had
come into the trust as being one where they were encouraged to join, to affiliate
to an organisation in a kind of a club type way. Whereas the way in which the
government and policy has moved is that the accountability, the lines of account-
ability, are much more sharper and clearer than they were even two years ago. So
the MAT have had to take more central control of their schools, and that’s been a
very, very difficult cultural change for some of our schools, because that’s not the
trust that they joined.^
Changes in the governance of the Trust follow specific recommendations in
Ofsted school and FI reports (e.g. on how the Trust needs to develop systems to
monitor school performance and hold teachers and headteachers to account), but
examples from other similar MATs who have schools with good Ofsted grades
also reinforce centralized control as the most effective improvement strategy for
large, nationally organized MATs as is explained by the CEO:
BThe trusts that have been the most successful generally have quite a bit of
control over the schools they have managed, we think of X, we think of Y, we think
about Z, um…those big secondary trusts where they’ve said this is the way we do
things, have been more successful than the ones where the schools have been left
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to their own devices to get on with things. And so we have moved away from a
very loose arrangement between our schools to one which is much tighter and the
relationship’s much deeper.^
The change is characterized in the year 2/3 annual report as a new membership
model for schools joining the Trust, with a change in emphasis from Bearned
autonomy^ to Bcollective responsibility ,^ under which all schools are drawn into the
Trust through a regional structure and the establishment of a range of cross-Trust
working groups, the latter tasked with the development of shared systems of curriculum
planning and assessment.
Regional structure From year 3 onwards, the Trust starts developing a regional
structure to address the culture of Bfirefighting^ and create a more long-term
approach to school improvement. The need for such a structure is indicated by
the disappointing outcomes of several Ofsted inspections. The CEO and
headteacher of Amaryllis describe how the Trust started to appoint executive
heads who work with two or more schools from year 3 onwards, while an analysis
of Annual Reports (years 3–5) shows that the Trust gradually started to move
towards a structure of regional hubs (with three to five schools in a hub with an
executive head) to allow for a more sustainable structure of accountability and
support. Each hub is overseen by an executive head who has, according to the
headteacher of Amaryllis, an important role in ensuring that support provided by
good and outstanding schools is not Babused^.
The CEO of the Trust explained how an executive head has statutory responsibility
over the schools and decides on levels of support for each school, depending on the
level of expertise and confidence of the headteacher of the school; the executive head is
also responsible for the performance management of senior staff in schools. The
headteacher of Campanula Academy further explains how the executive head is line
managed by members of the trust and governors and how the executive head line
manages the school head.
The CEO explains in the interview that each hub would include a mixture of low and
high performing schools where a similar scheme of delegation is put in place for each
hub to clarify decision-making at the hub and trust level. Each hub only has one
governing body and close links to a teaching school that would either be part of the hub
or located in the region.
The move towards a regional structure is reinforced in meetings with the RSC
who supports the model as being more sustainable. The RSC explains that other
large national MATs who have been particularly successful in improving their
schools’ Ofsted grades have implemented similar structures. An external review,
commissioned by the Trust at the end of the year 4 summer term (Annual Report
year 4/5), of its internal governance arrangements also informed a restructuring of
the Trust into regional hubs.
Shifting from financial/operational control to school improvement and
performance Over the years, centralized control of schools has not only increased
but also shifted from financial and operational control to school improvement and
school performance. The year 4/5 annual report shows centralized:
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& Payroll and HR support;
& Leadership and governance advice;
& Property management;
& Information technology systems;
& Management information system;
& Finance;
& Marketing and communication;
In addition, the headteachers of Foxglove and Primrose academy confirm that
all schools are now required to follow the national curriculum (even the free
schools who are not required to do so by the DfE) and implement common
assessment policies. Some of the policies around curriculum and assessment
(e.g. the implementation of common assessments) were initially developed by
central staff but not Bbought into^ by schools; in response, the Trust sets up
working groups of schools to develop common approaches which are then
discussed and confirmed in joint headteacher meetings. A revision in the schemes
of delegation and terms of reference in year 4 confirms and clarifies the respon-
sibilities of headteachers, school governing bodies, the CEO of the Trust and the
board of directors.
Changes are also visible in the setup of the central staff. The staff initially
included project managers, HR people and finance people who had never worked
in schools, and some of the staff were replaced with people with expertise in
school improvement after year 4. Years 3–5 see the setting up of new roles to
provide educational support for schools: one Primary Phase Leader, one Second-
ary Phase Leader, one Professional Development Manager, a Data and Impact
Manager and new posts in safeguarding, CPD, communications, property man-
agement and procurement.
Improvement boards External accountability and particularly Ofsted school in-
spections also impact on the governance of individual schools. For schools in
special measures, the local governing body (which includes a mix of local people)
is replaced by Improvement Boards with a greater number of Trust representa-
tives. The Improvement Boards include education professionals from the central
staff of the Trust as a strategy to improve schools in an Ofsted category or where
Ofsted criticized the governing body in its school inspection report. According to
the headteacher of Amaryllis and Primrose academy, dysfunctional governing
bodies were not asking the right questions of the headteachers, and were not
challenging the headteacher on school improvement and performance data. Ofsted
reports indicate the Trust replaced the local governing body in five of their schools
to execute more control over schools, but also to become better informed about
the support needed.
Headteacher performance management Increased centralized control is also enacted
through the performance management of headteachers. The headteachers of Primrose
and Amaryllis explain how the Trust has recently developed a common structure for
target setting in all schools; targets are now jointly set by the headteacher, the local
governors and a senior central staff member. These follow the same outline structure of
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topics and are tweaked so that each school has specific data targets and teaching and
learning targets, reflecting their leadership team’s performance and unique areas for
school improvement. Targets are, according to the headteachers of Amaryllis academy
and Foxglove, also set on budget, the school’s situation in terms of standards and
Ofsted grades, pupil performance, collaboration (working outside of the school and
sharing practices) and safeguarding; areas which are also part of the Ofsted school
inspection framework.
5 Conclusion and discussion
This paper presented a case study of a MAT in England. We explored how the external
accountability of schools in the network and of the Trust changes the network over
time. Our findings indicate that the combination of accountability activities impact on
both the properties of the network and its internal mechanisms of quality control. The
most prominent changes are the shift towards more centralized control over, and
monitoring of curriculum, assessment and school improvement. Changes also include
a pause in the growth of the Trust and the establishment of a regional structure of
school collaboration with an executive head who acts as an intermediary between the
Trust and a small group of schools.
One of the key findings of our study is the recognition that single-member
accountability can prevent network development and motivate a structure of
strong hierarchical control around the framework used to hold individual members
to account. In our case study, Ofsted school inspections had a dominant role in the
external accountability of the MAT, and as such also structured and informed the
internal quality control, governance and size of the MAT, particularly in the
following ways:
– Support from the Trust and Ofsted Boutstanding^ or Bgood^ schools is allocated to
schools judged to Brequire improvement^ or schools in Bspecial measures^, creat-
ing a culture of short-termism which constrains the development of more sustain-
able mechanisms for internal quality control to monitor, support and improve all
schools over time
– Distribution of resources is (until year 6) tied to Ofsted school inspection grades
where schools in special measures have to pay a higher membership fee
– Schools Brequiring improvement^ or in Bspecial measures^ are monitored more
intensively by RSCs and the Trust and more likely re-brokered into other Trusts
who have a portfolio of schools with good Ofsted grades
– Head teachers’ performance targets are set around Ofsted grades as well as specific
standards in the inspection framework
– An important criteria for the allocation of schools to regional hubs is their Ofsted
grade, ensuring a mixture of schools with good and failing grades as an indicator of
available and required support capacity
– Trusts with a portfolio of overall good/outstanding schools act as good practice
examples within the system, and inform the structure and collaboration in other
MATs (e.g. regional Bhub^ structure and centralized monitoring and control)
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– Governing bodies of schools Brequiring improvement^ or in Bspecial measures^
are replaced by Improvement Boards with Trust representatives who have a school
improvement background.
These examples indicate how internal quality control in the MAT is focused on the
performance of individual schools as measured in Ofsted frameworks, with little
development of network-level outcomes that go beyond what is measured and contrib-
utes to single school outcomes (such as transitioning of students from primary to
secondary).
Similar findings were reported by Sedgwick (2016) who studied the collaboration
among a range of publicly funded program service providers. She found that strong
single-member accountability has clear implications for the outcomes of the network as
a whole as it prevents strong inter-organizational relationships and undermines the
integration of missions and tasks, and collaborative service provision. Schools who are
predominantly held accountable for their own performance have few incentives to
participate in comprehensive joint planning and sharing of risks or to give up autonomy
to a network-level authority. A lack of alignment in single-member and network-level
accountability creates tensions for particularly high performing schools who have to
fulfil both organizational goals (set by single school inspections) and collaborative
goals (supporting peers in special measures), thus juggling organizational and collab-
orative identities (Sedgwick 2016).
Our findings clearly indicate how vertical, one-way, top-down forms of account-
ability are not supportive of the creation of inter-organizational networks that are agile
and flexible enough to effect change. Countries that move towards Bnetwork
governance^ to coordinate their education system need to rethink their education
accountability policy and take into account the complexities, interdependencies and
dynamics that characterize governance network processes. Given the complex nature of
problems and policies with which governance networks deal, their accountability
should not be built on standardized pre-set frameworks. Instead, the accountability of
networks should, according to Klijn and Koppejan (2014) and Papadopoulos (2014),
accept multiple standards and indicators and support the development of peer account-
ability and network homogeneity.
Ehren et al. (2017) provide a description of such alternative network accountability.
They provide examples of how the methodology used by Inspectorates of Education or
other Baccountees^ can capture the mechanisms and conditions that explain the func-
tioning and performance of the network, adapt to local context and the type of networks
they are inspecting and create the conditions in which such networks effectively steer
themselves. Such approaches would include multiple levels of analysis (individual,
interpersonal and collective) at which influence occurs, and use constructivist ap-
proaches to develop and test theories of Bhow something works^.
These models feature more subjectivist approaches to valuing and judging the
performance and quality of networks, compared to the types of Bpass/fail^ decisions
and standardized evaluation criteria accountees (inspectorates of education) often use.
Subjectivist approaches to valuing are more responsive to the object of evaluation and
are guided by the meanings people construct in particular places, times and situations,
recognizing the dynamic nature of human activity (Christie and Alkin 2013). Stake-
holders and users of external accountability (such as schools within a Trust) need to be
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actively involved in making judgements of the outcomes and functioning of the
network (Ehren et al. 2017). The involvement of stakeholders ensures that
Baccountees^ (HMI, RSCs) take into account multiple realities when making a value
judgement. In such approaches, the locus of judgement moves from the inspector as the
primary arbiter of the value a programme or service to facilitating the valuing by
others, such as stakeholders and users. Such approaches can be found in Btheory-driven
evaluation^, Bcomprehensive evaluation^ and Bprogramme evaluation^, to name a few,
and are expected to enhance the overall effectiveness of networks, such as MATs,
through a model that is more embedded in the evaluation and learning of the network
itself and with closer links to the network-internal mechanisms of quality control. Such
external accountability is also expected to promote the integration of schools into the
network and support and create new types of network-level outcomes that go beyond
the reach of individual schools. Only then will MATs be able to provide more
innovative, locally responsive and affordable services to their local communities.
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